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Abstract
We wish to study optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes. Do real
world taxes share some of their features? What policy prescriptions
can be made? We study a two period model, where the consumers and
government each have separate budget constraints in the two periods, so
income cannot be transferred between periods. Labor supply in both
periods is chosen by the consumers. The government has memory,
so taxes in the rst period are a function of rst period labor income,
whereas taxes in the second period are a function of both rst and second
period labor income. The government cannot commit to future taxes.
Time consistency is thus imposed as a requirement. The main results
of the paper show that time consistent incentive compatible two period
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taxes involve separation of types in the rst period and a di¤erentiated
lump sum tax in the second period, provided that the discount rate is
high or utility is separable between labor and consumption. In the
natural extension of the Diamond (1998) model with quasi-linear utility
functions to two periods, an equivalence of dynamic and static optimal
taxes is demonstrated, and a necessary condition for the top marginal
tax rate on rst period income is found.
Keywords: Optimal Income Taxation; Time Consistency; Incentive
Compatibility; Sequential Information Revelation; Optimal Dynamic
Taxation
JEL Codes: H21, D82, J22
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1 Introduction
We wish to study optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes. What do they
look like? How do they change over time? Do real world taxes share some
of their features? What policy prescriptions can be made? How do these
prescriptions di¤er from those of the static model? In particular, must the
top marginal tax rate be zero?
The public nance literature considers mainly static taxation. The macro-
economic literature considers mostly proportional taxes1 (possibly on multiple
income sources) over time, and thus is more closely related to the optimal com-
modity tax literature. For instance, information accumulated about the type
of a particular taxpayer in one period typically cannot be used in the next,
since the tax rate is unique (the same for all income from a source); thus, type
di¤erentiated lump sum taxes are excluded. Another feature of this literature
is ex ante tax policies, implying either commitment or that information re-
vealed is not used to formulate tax policy. A third feature of this literature is
the assumption that current period taxes are a function only of current period
income, precluding the possibility that current period taxes are a function of
previous periodsrevelations of income.2 Each paper in the literature employs
at least one and possibly more than one of these features, thus distinguishing it
from our work. Examples include Krusell et al (1997), Benhabib et al (2001),
Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), Persson and Tabellini (2002), Albanesi and
Sleet (2006), Kocherlakota (2005), Doepke and Townsend (2006), and Bisin
and Rampini (2006)3. In defense of these models, the main purpose is to in-
troduce heterogeneity of consumers using information asymmetries rather than
to investigate the dynamics of sequential information revelation, our focus.
We study a two period model as a beginning. The consumers and the
1Often, taxes with a transfer (either positive or negative) at zero are excluded, so when
the macroeconomic literature says linear,it means proportional. Of greater importance,
the reader should note that given the standard result that the marginal rate faced by the
highest ability person in the economy is zero for an optimal tax, the only linear taxes that
are second best are uniform lump sum taxes. Thus, the restriction to linear taxes often
employed in this literature simplies the analysis, but generally forces taxes to be third best
and inferior to nonlinear taxes.
2Our view is that optimal taxes could rely only on current period but not past periods
income revelations, but that this should be derived endogenously from the optimal income
tax problem.
3Two features of this last model are that hidden e¤ort is chosen only once, and that
it is never optimal to separate types in the second period when there is no government
commitment.
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government each have independent budgets in each of the two periods, so
wealth cannot be transferred over time. The government has memory, so rst
period tax liability is a function of rst period income only, but second period
tax liability can be a function of both rst and second period income. Taxes
are general (possibly nonlinear) functions of income. The government cannot
commit to future tax functions, so time consistency is imposed as a restriction
on taxes. Our main results involve analysis of the rst and second order
conditions for incentive compatibility in the consumer problem, followed by
characterizations of optimal taxes under time consistency. The major theorem
says that time consistent, incentive compatible income taxes typically involve
separation of types in the rst period followed by a di¤erentiated lump sum
tax in the second period, provided that the discount rate is high or utility is
separable between labor and consumption. Thus, the second period tax rate
as a function of second period income is constant. The separation of types
in the rst period is incentive compatible, in the sense that consumers know
whats coming in the second period but choose to reveal their types anyway.
In the context of the natural extension of the Diamond (1998) model to
dynamics, utilities are time separable, quasi-linear and involve discounting.
We nd an equivalence between optimal taxes in our dynamic extension and
static optimal income taxes. In general, there is a continuum of optimal
dynamic taxes corresponding to a given optimal static tax. Moreover, we nd
that not only does the separation of types in the rst period occur, followed
by a di¤erentiated lump sum tax in the second period, but this equivalence
allows us to give a necessary condition on the marginal tax rate at the top of
the income distribution for income in the rst period.
The basic structure of this paper is to proceed from the most general to
the most specic framework. Of course, as more assumptions are imposed,
more results follow.
The two papers in the literature most closely related to our work are Brito,
Hamilton, Slutsky and Stiglitz (1991), henceforth BHSS, and Roberts (1984).
BHSS study a model with government commitment concerning future taxes,
two types of taxpayers, and an innite time horizon. One focus of their study
is the relationship between static randomized taxes and nonstationary dynamic
taxes. They nd, for example, that under some conditions the nonstationary
dynamic optimal income taxes are rst best, but under other conditions, they
are not. Revelation or separation of types occurs in the rst period in this
model, since the government has committed itself not to use this information
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in future periods. The possibility that pooling might occur in the rst period,
and the possibility that incentive constraints for periods beyond the rst might
bind, is not considered in this work. Roberts (1984) studies optimal income
taxation under no commitment with discrete types and an innite time horizon.
He nds (see his Proposition 8) that separation of types will never occur over
the innite horizon. This work ignores the case where government revenue
requirements are large and a pooling equilibrium (where all consumers earn the
same income and pay the same tax) might bankrupt lower ability consumers.
In that case, a pooling equilibrium is not feasible.
In more recent work, Battaglini and Coate (2008) study a model with two
types of agents, quasi-linear utility, and an innite time horizon. Their focus
is on stochastic type changes from period to period, while allowing government
commitment to tax policies, though they do discuss conditions under which
optimal policies with commitment are the same as those without commitment.
Battaglini (2007) studies the analogous problem in the principal-agent frame-
work with two time periods. In an innite horizon model, Acemoglu et al
(2008) studies a similar model where the government is self-interested and
there are stochastic type changes. In contrast, we do not consider stochastic
type changes over time.
We feel that our assumptions are natural. We do not assume that gov-
ernment commitment is possible, because it usually isnt available. We use
a nite time period approach, since actors (particularly taxpayers) are nite-
lived.4 And this assumption makes for a large contrast between our results
and those of Roberts (1984).5 Finally, we use a continuum of types, since
this makes the analysis much easier by employing the rst order approach to
incentive compatibility.
In an interesting, related paper, Kapicka (2006) considers optimal nonlinear
income taxation in an innite horizon model. Steady states are examined when
the time of consumers can be spent on schooling, leisure or labor. Human
capital is accumulated through schooling. Kapicka nds that optimal tax
rates are lower in this framework than in the static framework due to the
4One could conceive of an innitely lived government with nitely lived taxpayers. We
conjecture that this leads to results similar to ours, even in an overlapping generations
framework. In particular, the government would impose a di¤erentiated lump sum tax on
the older workers, and an optimal income tax on the younger, whose types are currently
unknown.
5In particular, consider the possibility that the Roberts results are only true if the time
horizon is innite.
5
additional ine¢ ciencies caused by lower human capital accumulation in the
dynamic context as opposed to the static context. A key assumption made
by Kapicka is that current period tax liability depends only on current period
income. Thus, it is assumed that the government has no memory.6 In
contrast, our two period model allows the government to use information on
income gleaned from the rst period tax when formulating the second period
tax, so the government has memory. One of our main results says that when
the government has memory and imposes a time consistent tax, then it will
not be optimal for the government to forget the information it obtained in the
rst period when formulating the second period tax, though it has this option.
In fact, it is precisely this dynamic information revelation question that makes
analysis of our problem so di¢ cult. Actually, in our model the government
does not need to see a long history of incomes, but just one previous periods
incomes, in order to separate types.
We note in passing that most of the literature also completely neglects the
problem of existence of an optimal tax.
For those readers better acquainted with the principal-agent literature on
incentives, it is useful to outline the comparisons between the (static) optimal
income tax model and the standard principal-agent model. First, sometimes
there are one or few agents in the principal-agent model, while there is often
(but not always) a continuum in the optimal income tax model. Second,
in the optimal income tax model, once an agent or taxpayer chooses their
action (labor supply), there is no residual uncertainty for the agent. In the
principal-agent model, sometimes there is residual uncertainty, specically a
non-degenerate distribution over outcomes. This makes a di¤erence in the
formal structure of the model (specically in the second order conditions for
incentive compatibility). Third, in the principal-agent literature, linear or
quasi-linear utility is generally employed. The focus of the optimal income tax
model is on the consumption-leisure trade-o¤, so more general utility functions
are used. Fourth, the optimal income tax model has a revenue constraint,
while the principal-agent model does not. Fifth, the principal-agent model
has voluntary participation or individual rationality constraints, whereas the
optimal income tax model does not.
There is, however, a related problem in the optimal income tax literature.
The income earning ability of each taxpayer is limited by the income they
6In other words, the model uses an innitely repeated static optimal income tax frame-
work, modied by the accumulation of human capital over time.
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could earn if they worked all of the time and had no leisure. This capacity
constraintis type-specic and is usually ignored in the literature; see Berliant
and Page (2001) for a formal statement and analysis. Another way of making
this comparison between models is to note that in the principal-agent model,
consumption is not bounded below, while in the optimal income tax model,
income and consumption are bounded below by zero and above by the ca-
pacity constraint. In a model with quasi-linear utility but without voluntary
participation or capacity constraints, one can achieve rst best (i.e., the in-
centive constraints are not binding). Optimal income taxation often gives up
quasi-linear utility and imposes capacity constraints; principal-agent models
impose voluntary participation constraints. Each leads to interesting impli-
cations. However, if one replaces the Pareto criterion with a social welfare
function, then one might not be able to attain its optimal value in a world with
quasi-linear utility and no capacity or voluntary participation constraints.
These di¤erences between the principal-agent and optimal income tax model
are obvious and supercial. There is, however, one deeper and more impor-
tant di¤erence. In the principal-agent literature, the objective is usually to
maximize the welfare of the principal. This leads to an opposition of interests
between the principal and agent. In the optimal income taxation literature,
the goal is to nd (constrained) Pareto optimal allocations, though sometimes
a social welfare function is used as the objective. This leads to a congruence
of interests between the government and taxpayers.
The point is that there are substantial formal di¤erences, as well as simi-
larities, between the two frameworks.
With this discussion in hand, it is important to discuss the Ratchet E¤ect
in the context of optimal income taxation. For the principal-agent model, this
is the name given to the idea that in a multi-period environment where there
is no commitment, the agent is loathe to reveal the information it has early on
because once the principal has this information, it can extract all the remaining
surplus. Of course, the agent is aware of this and reacts appropriately, specif-
ically by pooling in early periods. See La¤ont and Tirole (1993) or Salanié
(1997) for more complete explanations.
Naturally, an analog of the e¤ect can be found in the optimal income tax
model, though it is altered by the di¤erences between the two models detailed
above. Of these, the most important are the presence of capacity constraints in
the optimal income tax model and the di¤erence in objectives between the two
models. The capacity constraint can rule out pooling with types at the low end
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of the distribution, since the utility of a high type from pretending to be a low
type can be very small. In other words, in order to pool with low types in early
periods but still satisfy their capacity constraints, the income and consumption
of all types must be very low. Second, the objectives of the government and
the taxpayers are not opposed, as they are in the principal-agent model, so
the taxpayers do not need to worry as much about the government extracting
all the remaining surplus once the taxpayers reveal their type. In fact, they
might wish to reveal it. Thus, it is not at all obvious that the results from
contract theory carry over the optimal income tax model.
Dillén and Lundholm (1996) discuss the Ratchet E¤ect in the optimal in-
come tax model when utilities are (a concave function of) a quasi-linear func-
tion in each time period. Linear tax functions with two types and a utilitarian
planner are employed. The main results compare the characteristics of static
with dynamic optimal income taxes. Linear tax functions in this context are
particularly troubling, for two reasons we have already given. First, with only
two instruments (the slope and intercept of the tax function) and a budget in
each period, there is only one degree of freedom in the choice of tax function
in each period. For example, with more than two types, the planner might
not have enough freedom to discriminate e¤ectively between types. Second,
as already remarked, linear taxes are generally dominated by nonlinear taxes.
A comparison between static and dynamic optimal nonlinear income taxes is
of course desirable, but is much more di¢ cult than in the linear case both
because there is no unique, well-dened marginal tax rate, and because even
the characterization of static optimal nonlinear taxes is so di¢ cult. In fact,
for the quasi-linear case, we show in Theorem 4 below that such a comparison
is fruitless, because many dynamic optimal taxes correspond exactly to each
static optimal tax. Finally, if randomization of income by agents is neglected,
the two type model yields equilibria in which there is always either full pooling
or full separation. We strongly suspect that equilibria in models with more
types involves more complex behavior.
In the next section, we give notation. In section 3 we write down the
optimization problems of the consumers and the government. The rst or-
der approach to incentive compatibility is studied in section 4, while section
5 examines necessary conditions for a time consistent, incentive compatible
tax; these conditions apply directly to time consistent optimal income taxes.
Section 6 considers the Diamond (1998) example in our framework. Section
7 comments on conclusions and extensions, while an appendix contains two
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longer proofs.
2 Notation
Consumers di¤er by an ability parameter, w, often interpreted as a wage. Let
w 2 [w;w] = W  <++. The types of individuals are completely specied
by w. All references to measure-theoretic concepts are to Lebesgue measure
m on <. There is a population density function f : W ! <++, where f
is integrable. The density function is common knowledge, but each agents
ability is private information. The only anonymous lump sum taxes that can
be used are thus uniform, but even such taxes must be bounded by the earning
capacity of the lowest ability individual.
We denote consumption by c 2 <+ and labor by l 2 [0; 1], where the
total amount of labor that can be supplied in a period is 1. Leisure is given
by 1   l. In this two period model, we denote time period by subscripts.
All consumers are identical except for their wage. Their utility is given by
a twice continuously di¤erentiable function U : (<+  [0; 1])2 ! <. We
write U(c1; l1; c2; l2). We sometimes assume that @U@c1 > 0,
@U
@l1
< 0, @U
@c2
> 0,
@U
@l2
< 0. Often we will use special cases. We say that U is time separable if
U(c1; l1; c2; l2) = u(c1; l1)+u(c2; l2), where the felicity functions of all consumers
are the same twice continuously di¤erentiable functions u; u : <+ [0; 1]! <.
We say that U is time separable with discounting when it is time separable and
u(c; l) =  u(c; l). In this special case, all consumers have a common discount
factor  2 <++ and time separable utility: U(c1; l1; c2; l2) = u(c1; l1) +  
u(c2; l2).
We dene gross income in a period as y = w  l. If there are no taxes, then
c = y. Let Y = [0; w], the set of possible incomes.
An income tax (in a given period) is an indirect mechanism, since it is
based on a revelation of income rather than type. It is not hard to map from
a tax on types to an income tax and vice versa, provided that (endogenous)
income is an increasing function of type. We use indirect mechanisms in this
paper only because direct mechanisms would complicate notation.
Let a measurable function t1 : Y ! < denote a rst period tax function,
and let T1 denote the set of all measurable maps from Y into <. Let a
measurable function t2 : Y  Y ! < denote a second period tax function, and
let T2 denote the set of all measurable maps from Y  Y into <. It accounts
for both rst and second period incomes, since information might be revealed
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in the rst period. A tax system is a pair (t1; t2) 2 T1  T2. The idea here is
that the rst period tax function t1 is a (measurable) function of revealed rst
period income only. The second period tax function t2 is a function of both
revealed second period income y2 and information (income) y1 revealed in the
rst period.
3 Statement of the Problem
We assume that the government has memory, so that the problem is not simply
a repeated one period optimization. In a two period model, there are many
possible regimes. For instance, one could have a pooling equilibrium (all
incomes are the same) in the rst period, and a separating tax in the second
period. More interesting is the case where one has a separating tax in the
rst period such that the consumers reveal their types even though they know
that the government will impose a type specic (di¤erentiated) lump sum tax
in the second period. To nd the optimal tax, one must nd the optimum in
each of these classes (and any others possible), and take the best among them.
We will sometimes assume (as is standard in the literature) that the gov-
ernment has a utilitarian objective:Z
W
U(c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w))  f(w)dw
where c1 : W ! <+, l1 : W ! [0; 1], c2 : W ! <+, l2 : W ! [0; 1] are
all measurable functions. Alternatively, we will use the concept of second
best Pareto optimality, which we will dene formally below. The government
also has revenue constraints. Let R1 be the (exogenous) revenue to be raised
in period 1 and let R2 be the (exogenous) revenue to be raised in period 2.
Perhaps this revenue is used to fund a public good that is additively separable
in consumersutility.
This brings up the issue of saving on the parts of either or both of the
government and consumers. Can the consumers save, and can the govern-
ment issue debt or buy bonds? These are issues peripheral to the one we are
studying, namely sequential information revelation, and would only compli-
cate the problem by adding more endogenous variables, namely the choice of
consumption or saving.7 We relegate these issues to future work.
7It could also complicate the problem because capital income might be treated di¤erently
from labor income by the income tax.
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Given a tax system, consumers of type w have the following optimization
problem:
max
c1;c22<+
l1;l22[0;1]
U(c1; l1; c2; l2) (1)
subject to
l1  w   t1(l1  w)  c1
l2  w   t2(l1  w; l2  w)  c2
Hence, the governments problem is:
max
(t1;t2)2T1T2
Z
W
U(c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w))  f(w)dw (2)
subject to
c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w) measurable and solving (1) almost surely in w 2 W ,Z
W
t1(l1(w)  w)  f(w)dw  R1Z
W
t2(l1(w)  w; l2(w)  w)  f(w)dw  R2
A utilitarian optimal tax system (t1; t2) 2 T1T2 is dened to be a solution
to this problem.
A tax system (t1; t2) 2 T1  T2 is called feasible if there exist
c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w) measurable and solving (1) almost surely in w 2 W ,Z
W
t1(l1(w)  w)  f(w)dw  R1Z
W
t2(l1(w)  w; l2(w)  w)  f(w)dw  R2
A (second best8) Pareto optimal tax system (t1; t2) 2 T1  T2 is a feasible tax
system (with associated c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w)) such that there is no other
feasible tax system (t01; t
0
2) 2 T1T2 (with associated c01(w); l01(w); c02(w); l02(w))
such that U(c01(w); l
0
1(w); c
0
2(w); l
0
2(w))  U(c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w)) almost
surely in w 2 W , with strict inequality holding for a measurable set W 0  W ,
where
R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0. Notice that any utilitarian optimal tax system is
necessarily Pareto optimal.9
8The tax system is called second best due to the incentive compatibility constraints.
9It is often useful to characterize Pareto optima using a weighted utilitiarian objective
function, so the utilitarian and Pareto criteria can be merged. Of course, the Pareto frontier
can only be characterized in this way if the utility possibilities set is convex. In second best
systems where incentive constraints appear, such as our system, the utility possibilities sets
are often truncated in a way that renders them nonconvex; see Guesnerie (1995).
11
4 The First Order Approach to Incentive Com-
patibility
We examine problem (1) under the assumption of di¤erentiability of tax and
utility functions, using the denitions y1(w) = l1(w) w and y2(w) = l2(w) w.
For type w the problem reduces to:
max
y1;y22Y
U(y1   t1(y1); y1
w
; y2   t2(y1; y2); y2
w
)
Using subscripts on U to denote derivatives, the rst order conditions are:
U1  (1  @t1
@y1
) + U2  1
w
  U3  @t2
@y1
= 0 (3)
U3  (1  @t2
@y2
) + U4  1
w
= 0 (4)
The rst order conditions for the purely static (period 2 only) model are
the second set of conditions, (4). This corresponds exactly to expressions
obtained in the literature. In the standard static case, we obtain an ordinary
rst order di¤erential equation for incentive compatible tax systems. Here we
obtain a (nicely behaved) system of partial di¤erential equations. The third
term in equation (3) is an extra termin the system relative to the literature
on the static case. It represents the e¤ect of increased income in the rst
period on tax liability in the second period.
In the special case of time separability and discounting, using subscripts to
denote partial derivatives of u, we obtain rst order conditions for incentive
compatibility:
u1(y1   t1(y1); y1
w
)  (1  @t1
@y1
) + u2(y1   t1(y1); y1
w
)  1
w
  (5)
  u1(y2   t2(y1; y2); y2
w
)  @t2
@y1
= 0
  u1(y2   t2(y1; y2); y2
w
)  (1  @t2
@y2
) +   u2(y2   t2(y1; y2); y2
w
)  1
w
= 0 (6)
Theorem 1 (Second Order Conditions) Assume time separability and dis-
counting in the utility function. Further assume that u1  0, u11  0, u22 < 0,
u12  0, @2t1(@y1)2  0, @
2t2
(@y1)2
 0, @t1
@y1
 1, @t2
@y2
 1. Then there exists  > 0 such
that 8 < , the second order condition for consumer optimization in y1 holds,
so the rst order condition (5) characterizes optima. If, in addition, u2  0,
@2t2(y1;y2)
@y1@y2
 0 and @t2
@y1
 0, then if either u12 is su¢ ciently close to zero (or
12
zero) or if  is su¢ ciently small, then dy1(w)
dw
> 0, and in particular y1 is one
to one.
Proof: See Appendix.
These conditions are su¢ cient, but of course they are not necessary.
It is important to discuss the signicance of this result. Notice rst that
some of the assumptions of the theorem are imposed on an endogenous object,
namely the tax function. We have been unable to push these assumptions back
to primitives. Second, the last part of the Theorem, that implies separation of
types in the rst period, is of paramount interest to us. The rst part of the
theorem, that tells us that the rst order conditions characterize the solutions
to the consumersoptimization problems, is needed so that the second part of
the theorem yields the result we want. It is of little independent interest.
Theorem 2 Suppose that U(c1; l1; c2; l2) = V (c1 + c2; l1 + l2). Then any
incentive compatible tax satises: @t1
@y1
= @t2
@y2
  @t2
@y1
.
Proof: Equations (3) and (4) reduce to:
V1  (1  @t1
@y1
) + V2  1
w
  V1  @t2
@y1
= 0
V1  (1  @t2
@y2
) + V2  1
w
= 0
Simplifying, the result follows.
5 Necessary Conditions for a Time Consistent
Tax
As a preamble to the consideration of time consistent taxes, consider optimal
income taxes in our framework. Two regimes of interest are:
 Nothing is revealed in the rst period (all incomes are the same), and
an optimal static income tax is imposed in the second period. Thus,
R1 > w
R
W
f(w)dw implies this regime is impossible.
 A separating equilibrium occurs in the rst period, and a di¤erentiated
(type-dependent) lump sum tax is imposed in the second period. In this
case, t2 is constant as a function of y2. That is,
@t2(y1;y2)
@y2
= 0 8y1; y2 2 Y .
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In the rst case, obviously the top marginal tax rate is zero in the second
period for the usual reasons. In the second case, in the second period each
individual is facing a lump sum tax, so their marginal rates are always zero.
However, tax as a function of equilibrium income will not necessarily appear
to have a top marginal rate of zero, since the individualized lump sum taxes
could be increasing in type.
It is natural to try to advance an argument that when revelation of types
occurs in the rst period, and the government has memory, that the second
period tax should be a di¤erentiated lump sum tax. Here is how that argu-
ment, a proof by contradiction, would go. Suppose that the second period tax
is not lump sum, i.e. it is a function of period 2 income as well as period 1
income. (Di¤erentiated lump sum taxes will have zero derivative with respect
to period 2 income.) Next we design a new tax system that Pareto dominates.
Keep the rst period tax the same. Now replace the second period tax with
a di¤erentiated lump sum tax that assigns each consumer (separated in the
rst period) the same tax liability as in the original second period tax, so
there is no deadweight loss. This would clearly generate the same tax revenue,
and would Pareto dominate the original tax. The problem is that the new
tax might not be incentive compatible in the rst period, since the incentive
constraints are more severe. There is a trade-o¤ between an e¢ ciency gain in
the second period from moving from a distorting to a non-distorting tax, but
a possible e¢ ciency loss in the rst period since second period tax liability
is now a function only of rst period income (as is rst period tax liability),
so consumers have more of an incentive to pretend to be someone with lower
income and ability, since it a¤ects their second period tax liability. The result
appears not to be true in general, and probably requires some very technical
conditions concerning this trade-o¤. For instance, in the general case, its
possible that an optimum involves having the government (commit to) forget
rst period income when imposing the second period tax, that is, making the
second period tax a function of second period income only. Then the problem
reduces to a repeated static optimal income tax problem.
There is an entirely di¤erent argument for why the second period tax must
be a di¤erentiated lump sum tax. Suppose we impose subgame perfection
or time consistency on the equilibrium concept (in particular, for the govern-
ment). Suppose we impose the conditions of Theorem 1, so the rst period
tax separates. Will the government want to impose a second period tax that
ignores revelation in the rst period? It cannot credibly commit to do so, since
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once it gets to the second period decision node, given a Pareto or utilitarian
objective, it will want to impose a non-distorting tax in the second period.
So the use of this time consistency concept implies, in itself, that the second
period tax will be a di¤erentiated lump sum tax. And thus the second period
tax will not be a function of second period income. It is possible, however,
that a Nash equilibrium without time consistency Pareto dominates the one
with time consistency.
Denition 1 A tax system (t1; t2) 2 T is called utilitarian time consistent
if t2 solves the following optimization problem given t1 2 T1 and c1(w), l1(w)
measurable.
max
t022T2
Z
W
U(c1(w); l1(w); c
0
2(w); l
0
2(w))df(w)
subject toZ
W
t02(l1(w)  w; l02(w)  w)df(w)  R2
and subject to
c02(w); l
0
2(w) measurable and solving
max
c022<+
l022[0;1]
U(c1(w); l1(w); c
0
2; l
0
2)
subject to
l02  w   t02(l1  w; l02  w)  c02 almost surely in w 2 W .
Denition 2 A tax system (t1; t2) 2 T1  T2 is called Pareto time consistent
if the following holds given t1 2 T1 and c1(w), l1(w) measurable. There is no
t02 2 T2 such that U(c1(w); l1(w); c02(w); l02(w))  U(c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w))
almost surely in w 2 W , with strict inequality holding for a measurable set
W 0  W , where R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0, and such thatZ
W
t02(l1(w)  w; l02(w)  w)df(w)  R2
with
c02(w); l
0
2(w) measurable and solving
max
c022<+
l022[0;1]
U(c1(w); l1(w); c
0
2; l
0
2)
subject to
l02  w   t02(l1  w; l02  w)  c02 almost surely in w 2 W .
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Equivalent denitions can be formulated using backward induction, but
they are much messier. Notice that any utilitarian time consistent tax is
necessarily Pareto time consistent.
It is very important to note that the concept of time consistency employed
in a model must be logically related to the government objective function in
the following way. The set of taxes generated using time consistency must
be a set at least as small as the set generated by optimizing the government
objective function in the second period. For instance, using a Pareto objec-
tive with Pareto time consistency is ne, as is using utilitarian consistency
with a utilitarian objective. Employing a Pareto objective with utilitarian
time consistency works ne as well. Consider, however, employing a utilitar-
ian objective in conjunction with Pareto time consistency. In this case, the
government may wish, when it reaches its decision node in the second period,
to impose a utilitarian optimal income tax (given rst period decisions) rather
than one that is only Pareto optimal (but perhaps not utilitarian optimal).
Thus, it is natural to require that the notion of time consistency employed in
a model be compatible, in the sense we have given, with the objective function
of the government. For otherwise "time consistency" does not mean that the
government will hold to its decision when it reaches the second period.
Theorem 3 Let (t1; t

2) 2 T1T2 be a Pareto time consistent tax system such
that y1 is one to one. Then
@t2(y

1(w);y

2(w))
@y2
= 0 almost surely for fw 2 W j
f(w) > 0g.
Proof: Suppose that there is a measurable setW 0 such that @t

2(y

1(w);y

2(w))
@y2
6=
0 for w 2 W 0and R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0. We claim that this tax is not Pareto time
consistent. Consider the alternative tax system t2 2 T2 given by t2(y1; y2) =
t2(y1; y

2(y
 1
1 (y1))). Here, y
 1
1 denotes the inverse of the function y

1, which
is well-dened by assumption. Notice that this alternative tax system does
not depend on second period income, but only on rst period income.
Z
W
t2(l

1(w)  w; l2(w)  w)df(w)
=
Z
W
t2(y1(w); y

2(y
 1
1 (y1(w))))df(w)
=
Z
W
t2(y1(w); y

2(w))df(w)  R2
Incentive compatibility follows trivially from the denitions of c2(w) and
l2(w). Fix w 2 W 0. Then evaluated at (c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w)), (4) tells
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us that o¤ering tax t2, where t2(y1(w); y

2(w)) = t

2(y

1(w); y

2(w)) and
@t2
@y2
= 0,
leads to a local utility improvement for type w.
The theorem implies that any time consistent tax system is a lump sum
tax in the second period. In general, it will be a lump sum tax di¤erenti-
ated by consumer type, which is revealed in the rst period. The consumers
understand this when they make their rst period labor supply decision.
Since any utilitarian time consistent tax system is also Pareto time consis-
tent, the theorem applies to these tax systems as well.
Corollary 1 Let (t1; t

2) 2 T1  T2 be a Pareto time consistent tax system
satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. Then @t

2(y

1(w);y

2(w))
@y2
= 0 almost
surely for fw 2 W j f(w) > 0g.
Corollary 2 Suppose that U(c1; l1; c2; l2) = V (c1 + c2; l1 + l2), and that y1 is
one to one. Then any Pareto time consistent tax system has @t

2(y

1(w);y

2(w))
@y2
= 0
almost surely for fw 2 W j f(w) > 0g, so Theorem 2 applies and @t1
@y1
=   @t2
@y1
.
In this special case, it is typical that @t2
@y1
 0 so @t1
@y1
 0. This case
allows us to highlight the role of period 1 information in reducing the period
2 distortion in labor supply. With no government memory, one would expect
that @t1
@y1
= @t2
@y2
, and the labor supply distortion is the same in both periods.
But with memory, @t2
@y1
6= 0, and the labor supply distortion in the second period
disappears. This utility function allows the transfer of revenues between
periods without inducing reductions in labor supply relative to some given
lump sum tax in each period.
Denition 3 A utilitarian time consistent optimal tax is a tax system (t1; t2) 2
T1 T2 that solves problem (2) subject to the additional constraint that (t1; t2)
is utilitarian time consistent.
Denition 4 A Pareto time consistent optimal tax (t1; t2) 2 T1T2 is a feasi-
ble, Pareto time consistent tax system (with associated c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w))
such that there is no other feasible, Pareto time consistent tax system (t01; t
0
2) 2
T1T2 (with associated c01(w); l01(w); c02(w); l02(w)) such that U(c01(w); l01(w); c02(w); l02(w)) 
U(c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w)) almost surely in w 2 W , with strict inequality
holding for a measurable set W 0  W , where R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0. A tax system
is called monotonic if dy1
dw
> 0.
Denition 5 A tax system (t1; t2) 2 T1T2 is Pareto time consistent optimal
among monotonic tax systems if it is feasible (with associated c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w)),
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Pareto time consistent, and monotonic, and there is no other feasible, Pareto
time consistent, monotonic tax system (t01; t
0
2) 2 T1  T2 (with associated
c01(w); l
0
1(w); c
0
2(w); l
0
2(w)) such that U(c
0
1(w); l
0
1(w); c
0
2(w); l
0
2(w))  U(c1(w); l1(w); c2(w); l2(w))
almost surely in w 2 W , with strict inequality holding for a measurable set
W 0  W , where R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0.
Since the set of utilitarian time consistent taxes could be a strict subset of
Pareto time consistent taxes, it could be the case that a Pareto time consistent
optimal tax Pareto (or even utilitarian) dominates a utilitarian time consistent
optimal tax.
Corollary 3 Presuming either the conditions of Theorem 1 or directly that y1
is one to one, any [utilitarian or Pareto] time consistent optimal tax is Pareto
time consistent, so Theorem 3 applies and @t

2(y

1(w);y

2(w))
@y2
= 0 almost surely for
fw 2 W j f(w) > 0g.
6 The Diamond Model
We extend the static Diamond (1998) model using time separable utility and
discounting.
The utility function used by Diamond (1998) in our notation is:
u(c; l) = c+ v(1  l) (7)
where v : [0; 1] ! < and v is C2. Let v0 denote the derivative of v, and
let v00 be its second derivative. Assume that v0 > 0, v00 < 0. We refer to this
specication as the Diamond model.
Proposition 1 For the Diamond model, u12 = 0, so any incentive compatible
income tax satisfying the strict second order conditions locally, inequality (13),
with @
2t1
(@y1)2
 0, @t2
@y2
 1, @2t2(y1;y2)
@y1@y2
 0 and @t2
@y1
 0 has separation (dy1
dw
> 0) in
the rst period, regardless of the discount rate .
The proof follows directly from the proof of Theorem 1. Alternatively, we
could apply Theorem 1. We will generally assume that dy1
dw
> 0 in this section.
Equations (5) and (6) reduce to:
1  @t1
@y1
  v0(1  y1
w
)  1
w
    @t2
@y1
= 0 (8)
1  @t2
@y2
  v0(1  y2
w
)  1
w
= 0 (9)
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Notice that in this case, equation (9) gives us
1  v0(1  y2
w
)  1
w
=
@t2
@y2
Since the rst period tax is separating (that is, dy1
dw
> 0), then time consis-
tency implies @t2
@y2
= 0 and the equation
v0(1  y2
w
) = w (10)
completely determines y2 and l2.
The next result will give an equivalence between dynamic and static taxa-
tion in the Diamond model. In order to simplify its presentation, we provide a
statement of the static optimal income tax problem. Let a tax system for the
static model be represented by a measurable function t : Y ! <, and let T be
the collection of all such measurable functions. Consumption is represented
by c 2 <+ whereas labor supply is represented by l 2 [0; 1]. All consumers
have the same utility function u : <+ [0; 1]! <. For the next result, we will
be using the specication (7). Each consumer of type w solves the problem
max
c2<+
l2[0;1]
u(c; l) (11)
subject to
l  w   t(l  w)  c
If solutions to these problems exist, we denote them by c(w) and l(w),
where c : W ! <+ and l : [0; 1] ! <+ are both measurable functions. Of
course, we dene y = c  l and y(w) = c(w)  l(w). Given R 2 <, the revenue
constraint for the static problem isZ
W
t(l(w)  w)  f(w)dw  R (12)
Denition 6 A tax system t 2 T is called feasible if there exist measurable
c(w) and l(w) solving (11) almost surely in w, and that also satisfy (12). A
tax system t 2 T is called (second best) Pareto optimal in the static model
if it is feasible (with associated c(w) and l(w)) and there is no other feasible
tax system t0 2 T (with associated c0(w) and l0(w)) such that u(c0(w); l0(w)) 
u(c(w); l(w)) almost surely in w 2 W , with strict inequality holding for a
measurable set W 0  W , where R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0. We call a tax system t in
the static model monotonic if dy
dw
> 0. A tax system t 2 T is called (second
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best) Pareto optimal in the static model among monotonic tax systems if it
is feasible (with associated c(w) and l(w)) and monotonic, and there is no
other feasible, monotonic tax system t0 2 T (with associated c0(w) and l0(w))
such that u(c0(w); l0(w))  u(c(w); l(w)) almost surely in w 2 W , with strict
inequality holding for a measurable set W 0  W , where R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0.
In order to prepare for the statement of the next result, it is important
to inform the reader about some implicit assumptions. For the remainder of
the paper, we shall assume that consumers can transfer consumption between
periods at interest rate . In other words, we assume that c1 and c2 can take
on any real values, subject to c1+ c2  0. The analog in the static Diamond
model, which we will also use, is c  0. The capacity constraint, mentioned
in the introduction, has not required an explicit statement to this point. We
give one now.10 Since total time for work and leisure for any consumer in each
time period is 1, the capacity constraints in our two period model are y1  w,
y2  w. The analog in the static Diamond model will be y  w.
Theorem 4 Consider the Diamond model, and set R = R1 + R2. If a tax
system (t1; t

2) is Pareto time consistent optimal with
dy1
dw
> 0 in the two period
model, then t(y) = t1(y) +   t2(y) is Pareto optimal among monotonic tax
systems in the static model. If a tax system t is Pareto optimal and dy

dw
> 0 in
the static model, then every tax system (t1; t

2) satisfying t
(y) = t1(y)+ t2(y)
is Pareto time consistent optimal among monotonic tax systems in the two
period model.
Thus, the optima of the dynamic Diamond model are equivalent to those of a
properly formulated static Diamond model. Suppose that (t1; t

2) is Pareto time
consistent optimal and monotonic. Then the static tax t(y) = t1(y) +   t2(y)
is optimal among monotonic tax systems (note that t2 is a function of only
period 1 income, since it is a di¤erentiated lump sum tax in period 2).
Given an optimal income tax t in the static Diamond (1998) model, for
example one computed by Diamond, any feasible tax system (t1; t2) satisfying
t(y) = t1(y) +   t2(y) and the conditions of Theorem 1 or Proposition 1 (or
dy1
dw
> 0) will be Pareto time consistent optimal among monotonic tax systems.
There are many such tax systems. In fact, there are so many that neither the
10Up to this point, we have examined only necessary conditions implied by various types
of taxes. In the next theorem, we will actually have to prove that a particular tax is optimal,
and thus must satisfy the appropriate capacity constraints.
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rst nor the second period tax alone might look like the optimal tax in the
static model.
The intuition behind the theorem is as follows. Under the assumptions
of the Diamond model, labor supply is independent of consumption in each
period. The use of di¤erentiated lump sum taxes, which are rst best, in the
second period xes labor supply in that period, so taxes do not depend on
second period income at all. The distribution of tax payments across periods
a¤ects neither labor supply nor utility. So the planner is actually choosing
only the marginal tax rate in period 1 and the present value of tax liability
for each type, both of which depend only on rst period labor supply. The
present value of tax liabilities can be divided in many ways, making the tax
system in the two period model indeterminate.
Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary 4 A Pareto time consistent optimal tax (t1; t

2) for the Diamond
model satisfying dy

1
dw
> 0 also satises [@t

1(y1)
@y1
+ 
@t2(y1;y2)
@y1
] jy1=wl1(w), y2=wl2(w)=
0.11
Proof: Any Pareto time consistent optimal tax must generate a tax t
that is Pareto optimal among monotonic taxes in the static model, as given by
Theorem 4. The induced utility function in the static model is separable (and
in fact, quasi-linear) in consumption and leisure, so consumption is noninferior.
By Seade (1977, Theorem 1), dt
(y)
dy
jy=wl(w)= 0, and the result follows.12
7 Conclusions and Extensions
We have examined optimal income taxes in a two period model, beginning with
the rst and second order conditions for incentive compatibility. Then impos-
ing time consistency of taxes, we nd that if the discount rate is su¢ ciently
high or utility is separable in labor and consumption, a time consistent tax
has consumers revealing their types in the rst period, so the second period
tax is independent of second period income; it is essentially a type di¤erenti-
ated lump sum tax. Incentive constraints on rst period consumer income are
11In fact, we also know that @t

2(y1;y2)
@y2
= 0 everywhere.
12Although Seade assumes that the tax is Pareto optimal among all taxes, not just
monotonic ones, this fact is not used in his proof. Actually, his proof shows that if an
optimal tax t with dy

dw > 0 has a top marginal rate di¤erent from zero, then it can be
Pareto dominated by a tax that is monotonic.
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brutal, as the consumers know whats going to happen in the second period.
In the special case of stationary, time separable, quasi-linear utility with dis-
counting, we nd an equivalence between static and dynamic optimal income
taxes. In this case, an implication is that the present discounted value of the
marginal tax rate on rst period income at the top of the distribution must be
zero. There is a huge number of optimal dynamic tax systems that correspond
to a single optimal static tax; all that is required is that the present discounted
value of the dynamic tax is equal to the static tax for any rst period income.
In this sense, the optimal one period tax in a two period model is not identied.
The next step is to examine time consistent taxes when the discount rate
is low. We conjecture that all we will nd is that at the top of an interval
that has separation in the rst period, the marginal tax rate on rst period
income must be zero.
Our long term goal is to integrate the theory of optimal income taxation
with mechanism design. Each area brings useful ideas and techniques to the
other. A rst step in this direction is to examine the relationship between
direct and indirect mechanisms in our context of dynamic revelation of infor-
mation, namely the revelation and taxation principles.
Time consistent, incentive compatible taxes might also be useful for pur-
poses of positive political economy, where one replaces the Pareto or utilitarian
objective with a voting mechanism.
We leave examination of the question of existence of optimal taxes to future
work. Probably this issue can be addressed using the techniques of Berliant
and Page (2001).
As mentioned in section 3, it would be interesting to examine the implica-
tions of allowing consumers or the government to transfer wealth across time,
and to see how this alters our results.
Finally, we have examined the case where the correlation of a consumers
type in the rst and second periods is perfect. The case when there is no
correlation between types in the two periods is simply a repeated static optimal
income tax problem. Intermediate cases are clearly of interest.
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: For the purpose of this proof, dene G(y1; y2; w) =
u(y1 t1(y1); y1w )+u(y2 t2(y1; y2); y2w ). We remind the reader that subscripts
on functions represent partial derivatives with respect to the appropriate ar-
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guments except for the function t, where a subscript denotes the time period.
Note also that all terms with a  attached to them are evaluated at second
period bundles, while all terms without a  attached to them are evaluated at
rst period bundles. The rst order conditions are given by
G1 = u1(y1   t1(y1); y1
w
)(1  @t1(y1)
@y1
) +
1
w
 u2(y1   t1(y1); y1
w
)    u1(y2   t2(y1; y2); y2
w
)
@t2
@y1
= 0
G2 =   [u1(y2   t2(y1; y2); y2
w
)(1  @t2
@y2
) + u2(y2   t2(y1; y2); y2
w
)  1
w
] = 0
Useful second derivatives are
G11 = u11(1 @t1(y1)
@y1
)2+
1
w
u12(1 @t1(y1)
@y1
) u1 @
2t1
@(y1)2
+
1
w
u21(1 @t1(y1)
@y1
)+
1
w2
 u22 +   u11  [ @t2
@y1
]2     u1  @
2t2
@(y1)2
= u11  (1  @t1(y1)
@y1
)2 +
2
w
u12  (1  @t1(y1)
@y1
)  u1  @
2t1
@(y1)2
+
1
w2
 u22
+   u11  [ @t2
@y1
]2     u1  @
2t2
@(y1)2
G12 = G21 =    [u11  (1  @t2
@y2
)  @t2
@y1
+ u12  1
w
 @t2
@y1
+ u1  @
2t2
@y1@y2
]
G22 =   [u11  (1  @t2
@y2
)2 +
1
w
 u12  (1  @t2
@y2
)  u1  @
2t2
@(y1)2
+
1
w
 u21  (1  @t2
@y2
) +
1
w2
 u22]
=   [u11  (1  @t2
@y2
)2 +
2
w
 u12  (1  @t2
@y2
)  u1  @
2t2
@(y1)2
+
1
w2
 u22]
G13 =   y1
w2
 u12  (1  @t1(y1)
@y1
)  1
w2
 u2   y1
w3
 u22 +   y2
w2
 u12  @t2
@y1
G23 =   [  y2
w2
 u12  (1  @t2
@y2
)  y2
w3
 u22   1
w2
 u2]
Checking term by term, under the stated assumptions, G11 < 0, G22 < 0.
Let A =
"
G11 G12
G21 G22
#
. For the second order conditions, it is su¢ cient to
prove that A is negative denite, or
j A j= G11 G22   (G12)2 > 0 (13)
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The result follows by noticing that the rst few (negative) terms in G11 are
the only ones in the expression without  in them, whereas all terms in G22
and G12 have  in them. Hence (G12)2 tends to zero with 2 while G11  G22
tends to zero at rate .
For the second part of the theorem, notice thatA 1 = 1
G11G22 (G12)2
"
G22  G12
 G12 G11
#
.
By the implicit function theorem,
"
@y1(w)
@w
@y2(w)
@w
#
=  A 1
"
G13
G23
#
=  1jAj 
"
G22 G13  G12 G23
 G12 G13 +G11G23
#
.
Were actually only interested in the top part of the vector. G22 < 0, G23 > 0.
Under the additional assumptions of the theorem, G12  0. If u12 is su¢ -
ciently close to zero (or is zero) or if  is su¢ ciently small, then G13 > 0 and
we have @y1(w)
@w
> 0. 
Proof of Theorem 4: Suppose that (t1; t

2) is Pareto time consistent optimal
among monotonic tax systems in the two period model, but t(y) = t1(y) +  
t2(y) is not Pareto optimal and monotonic in the static model. Then there is a
measurable t : Y ! < such that R
W
t(wl(w))dw  R = R1+R2, d(wl(w))dw > 0,
where c(w); l(w) solvemaxc;l c+v(1 l) subject to wl t(wl)  c a.s.(W ), and
such that c(w)+v(1 l(w))  c(w)+v(1 l(w)), with strict inequality holding
for a measurable set W 0 with
R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0. We will nd a contradiction,
in that there is a feasible (t1; t2) that Pareto time consistent dominates (t1; t

2).
Dene t1(y1) = R1R1+R2  t(y1) and t2(y1; y2) = R2R1+R2  t(y1).13 In fact, second
period labor supply is the same for both tax systems, and determined by (10).
Evidently, the rst order condition for incentive compatibility of the system
(t1; t2) is, from (8),
1  @t1
@y1
  v0(1  y1
w
)  1
w
    @t2
@y1
= 1  R1
R1 + R2
 dt
dy
    R2
R1 + R2
 dt
dy
  v0(1  y1
w
)  1
w
= 1  dt
dy
  v0(1  y1
w
)  1
w
= 0
The last line follows from the rst order conditions for incentive compatibil-
ity of t, from the static model, so y1(w) = y(w). In fact, it is clear from these
calculations that the second order conditions for incentive compatibility are
the same for (t1; t2) (namely
dy1
dw
> 0) and t (namely dy
dw
> 0).14 Since dy
dw
> 0
by assumption, dy1
dw
> 0. The same arguments apply for y and y1; since the
13There are actually many ways to dene (t1; t2).
14Although we have not proved formally that these are, in fact, the second order condi-
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optimization problems for each type are the same, so are the solutions. We
will use this repeatedly in the sequel.Z
W
t1(y1(w))  f(w)dw
=
R1
R1 + R2

Z
t(y1(w))  f(w)dw
 R1
Z
W
t2(y1(w))  f(w)dw
=
R2
R1 + R2

Z
t(y1(w))  f(w)dw
 R2
So (t1; t2) is feasible. Now from incentive compatibility, y(w) = y1(w). So
c1(w) +   c2(w) + v(1  l1(w)) +   v(1  l2(w))
= y1(w)  t1(y1(w)) +   [y2(w)  t2(y1(w); y2(w))] + v(1  y1(w)
w
) +   v(1  y2(w)
w
)
= y(w)  [t1(y(w)) +   t2(y1(w); y2(w))] +   y2(w) + v(1  y(w)
w
) +   v(1  y2(w)
w
)
= y(w)  t(y(w)) + v(1  y(w)
w
) +   y2(w) +   v(1  y2(w)
w
)
= c(w) + v(1  y(w)
w
) +   y2(w) +   v(1  y2(w)
w
)
 c(w) + v(1  l(w)) +   y2(w) +   v(1  y2(w)
w
)
= y(w)  t(y(w)) + v(1  l(w)) +   y2(w) +   v(1 
y2(w)
w
)
= c1(w) + c

2(w) + v(1  l1(w)) +   v(1 
y2(w)
w
)
with strict inequality holding on W 0. So (t1; t2) Pareto time consistent
dominates (t1; t

2) among monotonic tax systems.
To prove the second part of Theorem 4, we prove its contrapositive. Sup-
pose that (t1; t2) is feasible and Pareto time consistent dominates (t1; t

2) among
monotonic tax systems. Note that since by denition, t2 satises (9) and (10),
tions, notice that in a rather trivial way (due, in part, to separability of the utility function),
agents facing either tax system are actually solving the same optimization problem. So the
solutions are the same.
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t2 is independent of y2. Dene t(y) = t1(y)+  t2(y). The optimization prob-
lem for consumers in the static model facing tax system t is thus
max
y
y   t1(y)    t2(y) + v(1  y
w
)
The rst order condition for incentive compatibility in the static model is
1  dt1(y)
dy
    dt2(y)
dy
  v0(1  y
w
) = 0
This is the same as (8). Moreover, since (t1; t2) satises the second order
conditions for incentive compatibility (namely dy1
dw
> 0), so does t (hence dy
dw
>
0).15 So y(w) = y1(w).
Z
W
t(y(w))  f(w)dw
=
Z
W
t1(y(w))  f(w)dw +  
Z
W
t2(y(w))  f(w)dw
 R1 +  R2 = R
c(w) + v(1  l(w))
= y(w)  t(y(w)) + v(1  y(w)
w
)
= y1(w)  t1(y1(w))    t2(y1(w)) + v(1  y1(w)
w
)
= c1(w) + [c2(w)  w  l2(w)] + v(1  l1(w))
Now (t1; t2) Pareto time consistent dominates (t1; t

2), so
c1(w) +   c2(w) + v(1  l1(w)) +   v(1  l2(w))
 c1(w) +   c2(w) + v(1  l1(w)) +   v(1  l2(w))
with strict inequality holding for a measurable set W 0 with
R
W 0 f(w)dw >
0. Since by incentive compatibility of (t1; t2) and (t1; t

2), (9) holds for both,
y2(w) = y

2(w) and l2(w) = l

2(w). So
c1(w) + [c2(w)  w  l2(w)] + v(1  l1(w))
 c1(w) + [c2(w)  w  l2(w)] + v(1  l1(w))
15Please see the previous footnote.
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Hence
c(w) + v(1  l(w))
 c1(w) + [c2(w)  w  l2(w)] + v(1  l1(w))
= c(w) + v(1  l(w))
with strict inequality holding for a measurable set W 0 with
R
W 0 f(w)dw > 0.
Thus, t(y) = t1(y) +   t2(y) Pareto time consistent dominates t(y) = t1(y) +
  t2(y) and dy

dw
> 0.
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